Mental Harm, Rescuers + the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) by Carver, Tracey
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Carver, Tracey (2010) Mental harm, rescuers and the Civil Liability Act
2002 (NSW). Torts in Focus, 85, pp. 1-5.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/40893/
c© Copyright 2010 CCH Australia Limited
Reproduced with the permission of CCH Australia Limited. Originally pub-
lished in the Tort in Focus, 2010, 85, 1-5. For more information see
www.cch.com.au
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
 
 
 
This is the author version published as: 
 
 
This is the accepted version of this article. To be published as : 
This is the author’s version published as: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Catalogue from Homo Faber 2007 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
 
Carver, Tracey (2010) Mental harm, rescuers and the Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (NSW). Torts in Focus, 85, pp. 1‐5. 
           
Copyright 2010 CCH Australia Limited 
1 
 
Mental Harm, Rescuers and the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) 
TRACEY CARVER* 
 
At common law, a duty of care may be owed to a claimant who suffers nervous shock or pure 
mental harm due to witnessing, or hearing about,1 physical injury caused to another due to a 
defendant’s negligence.  “Pure mental harm” is the ‘impairment of a person’s mental 
condition’ that is not suffered as a consequence of any other kind of personal injury to them.2  
However, as many accidents have the potential to create a wide circle of mental suffering to 
bystanders, family members or others not physically injured themselves, it has traditionally 
been ‘thought impolitic that everybody so affected should be able to recover damages from 
the tortfeasor.’3  ‘To allow such extended recovery would stretch liability too far.’4  
Nevertheless, whilst adopting a restrictive approach to liability, the common law courts have 
recognised that a defendant might owe a duty in relation to the pure mental harm suffered by 
one who foreseeably attends an accident scene to rescue another from a situation created by 
the defendant’s negligence.5   
In New South Wales, liability in this context now falls within the mental harm provisions of 
Part 3 of the Civil Liability Act 2002. Here, in relation to proceedings commencing on or after 
3 September 2002,6 section 30 provides that: 
(1) This section applies to the liability of a person (the defendant) for pure mental harm to a person (the 
plaintiff) arising wholly or partly from mental or nervous shock in connection with another person 
(the victim) being killed, injured or put in peril by the act or omission of the defendant. 
 
(2) The plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages for pure mental harm unless: 
(a) the plaintiff witnessed, at the scene, the victim being killed, injured or put in peril, or 
(b) the plaintiff is a close member of the family of the victim. 
“Close member of the family” of a victim is defined in section 30(5), and means the victim’s: 
parent or other person with parental responsibility for the victim; spouse or partner; child, 
stepchild or other person for whom the victim has parental responsibility; or brother, sister, 
half-sibling or step-sibling.   
As part of the civil liability reforms enacted in response to the perceived insurance crisis, the 
‘clear intention’ of section 30 was ‘to limit inter alia liability for pure mental harm arising from 
shock.’7 Consequently, by limiting a defendant’s liability to those who, not being a close 
family member, witnessed at the scene another being killed, injured or imperilled, section 
                                                            
* BBus(Accy)(Dist), LLB(Hons) (QUT); LLM (Cantab). Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of 
Technology.  Email: t.carver@qut.edu.au. 
1 For example, Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549 (‘Jaensch’) (nervous shock arising from what the claimant 
had seen and been told); Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Co (2003) 214 CLR 269 (hearsay shock). 
2 See eg, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 27. 
3 Glanville Williams ‘The Risk Principle’ (1961) 77 Law Quarterly Review 179, 192-3 in Storm v Geeves [1965] 
Tas SR 252, 263 (Burbury CJ). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Mount Isa Mines Limited v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383. 
6 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) sch 1, cl 6(2).   
7 Burke v New South Wales [2004] NSWSC 725, [61] (Malpass M) (‘Burke’).  See also Wicks v Railcorp; 
Sheehan v State Rail [2007] NSWSC 1346, [74]-[76] (Malpass AJ). 
2 
 
30(2) was considered potentially narrower than the position at common law.8    There, whilst 
not determinative,9 a claimant could recover not only if they directly perceived the occurrence 
of an accident, but also if they solely perceived its immediate aftermath (not limited to the 
accident scene).10 However, section 30(2) was thought to deny mentally injured rescuers the 
right to recover where they were unrelated to a victim and did not witness an accident occur, 
but later attended the scene.11  This issue was recently considered by the High Court in 
Wicks v State Rail Authority of New South Wales; Sheehan v State Rail Authority of New 
South Wales (‘Wicks’).12 
I. Wicks’ Case History 
The litigation in Wicks arose from the Waterfall train derailment in January 2003, in which 
seven people were killed and many others seriously injured.  The claimants, Wicks and 
Sheehan, were police officers.   They were among the first to arrive at the scene shortly after 
the accident’s occurrence and were directly involved, over many hours, in rendering 
assistance to accident survivors and moving them from the wreckage to safety.  
Consequently, they each claimed damages against State Rail for the psychiatric injury 
allegedly suffered by them as a result of their presence at the site and what they had 
witnessed there due to State Rail’s negligence.   
At first instance, before the Supreme Court,13 Malpass AJ dismissed Wicks’ and Sheehan’s 
claim on the basis that as they were not present during the derailment they had not 
witnessed, at the scene, passengers being killed, injured or put in peril.14  Accordingly, his 
Honour considered that the limitations imposed by section 30(2)(a) of the Civil Liability Act 
2002 (NSW) had not been met: 
In his second reading speech, the Minister presented the bill as restricting the recoverability of damages 
to, inter alia, “people present at the accident scene.”  It seems to me that the words “the scene” are 
referable to the scene of the shocking events brought about by the defendant’s acts or omissions during 
which the victim is killed or injured or put in peril.  In this case, the scene is that of the accident involving 
the derailment.  It is not referable to what happened thereafter (which may conveniently be referred to 
as the aftermath).15 
A majority of the Court of Appeal (Beazley and Giles JJA. McColl JA dissenting),16 similarly 
held that as a matter of statutory construction, the language of section 30(2)(a)’s witnessing 
requirement was not met as it obliged the claimant to directly observe17 ‘the causal event 
                                                            
8 Dominic Villa, Annotated Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (2004) 177-8; Nicole Seeto, ‘Shock Rebounds: Tort 
Reform and Negligently Inflicted Psychiatric Injury’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 293, 297-8, 304.  
9 Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Limited (2002) 211 CLR 317, 333, 340 (Gleeson 
CJ), 380, 394 (Gummow and Kirby JJ), 411-2 (Hayne J). 
10 See eg, Jaensch, above n 1, 607-8 (Deane J), 612 (Dawson J). 
11 RP Balkin and JLR Davis, Law of Torts (4th ed, 2009) 243. 
12 (2010) 267 ALR 23; [2010] HCA 22 (‘Wicks’). 
13 Wicks v Railcorp; Sheehan v State Rail [2007] NSWSC 1346. 
14 Ibid [72]-[81]. 
15 Ibid [76].  Cf Sheehan v SRA; Wicks v SRA [2009] NSWCA 261, [42] (Beazley JA), [152] (McColl JA); Wicks, 
above n 12, [41]. 
16 Sheehan v SRA; Wicks v SRA [2009] NSWCA 261. 
17 Whilst observation appeared to be the focus on the facts of Wicks, “witnessing” would appear to encompass 
both sight and hearing: Burke, above n 7, [67]. 
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whereby the person was being killed, injured or put in peril’ by the defendant’s act or 
omission.18   Consequently, as on the facts ‘the derailment was what put the victims in peril 
by the respondent’s act or omission,’19 section 30(2)(a) did not extend to persons, including 
those assisting in the rescue process, who came upon the scene after that incident was 
over.20  In reaching this conclusion, Beazley JA (with whom Giles JA agreed),21 was 
influenced by the ‘immediacy about the language’ used in section 30.22  Her Honour also 
considered that the ambit of section 30(2)(a) was “marked out” or restricted by the fact that,  
unlike its counterpart in section 32(2)(a) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), it did not refer to 
the plaintiff witnessing ‘at the scene, the victim being killed, injured or put in peril or the 
immediate aftermath of the victim being killed or injured.’23   
In dissent, McColl JA considered that it was ‘not necessary for a person seeking to satisfy 
section 30(2)(a) to have been present at the time of the principal causal event, in this case 
the derailment.’24 Nevertheless, her Honour dismissed the appeal due to insufficient evidence 
that the claimants had witnessed the victims being put ‘in an actual state of peril,’25 in that 
they had been ‘exposed to a danger which was a sequelae of the derailment in the sense 
that some aspect of the derailed train and/or the surrounding environment posed a danger.’26 
In McColl JA’s opinion, this was not satisfied by: the possibility that the victims’ conditions 
may deteriorate; or the risk that fallen powerlines posed to “rescuers.” 
II. The High Court’s Decision 
Whilst the defendant in Wicks admitted that it owed train passengers a duty of care, and had 
been negligent in its operation of the particular train in question, by failing to ensure the 
application of a “deadman’s” safety device in the event of driver incapacity,27 a similar 
concession was not made in relation to the claimants.  Furthermore, because both the New 
South Wales Supreme Court and Court of Appeal dismissed Wicks’ and Sheehan’s claim for 
falling outside the class of persons entitled to recover damages for pure mental harm under 
section 30 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), neither Court determined whether: 
1. State Rail owed each claimant, a rescuer, a duty of care?; or 
                                                            
18 Ibid [68] (emphasis added).  See also [74]-[76]. 
19 Ibid [76].  There was, on the facts, no further event occasioned as a consequence of the defendant’s 
negligence - for example, no ‘stanchion was knocked loose in the collision and then fell during the rescue 
process, killing or injuring passengers, or putting them in peril.’  Had there been, Beazley JA considered that 
any rescuer ‘who saw the stanchion crushing or pinning persons underneath and who suffered mental harm as 
a result, would, arguably at least, fall within s 30(2)(a)’: ibid [75]. 
20 Ibid [77]. 
21 Ibid [81]. 
22 Ibid [77]. 
23 Ibid.  See also [70]-[71]. 
24 Ibid [150].  For further explanation of her Honour’s reasons in this regard see: [140]-[149]. 
25 Ibid [154].  See also [145], [156]-[163] (McColl JA); [65] (Beazley JA). It was not ultimately argued that the 
claimants had witnessed, at the scene, a victim being killed or injured: Wicks v Railcorp; Sheehan v State Rail 
[2007] NSWSC 1346, [70], [81].   
26 Sheehan v SRA; Wicks v SRA [2009] NSWCA 261, [163].  Such as a carriage teetering on the edge of a cliff 
or left at risk of collision with another train: at [145].  
27 See eg, Wicks v Railcorp; Sheehan v State Rail [2007] NSWSC 1346, [25], [62]; Sheehan v SRA; Wicks v 
SRA [2009] NSWCA 261, [1], [25]; Wicks, above n 12, [5]. 
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2. Each claimant’s attendance at the derailment had caused him to suffer a recognised 
psychiatric illness?28  
Consequently, whilst the High Court appeal was similarly limited to a consideration of the 
interpretation of section 30,29 French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell 
JJ also commented upon the broader legislative framework relating to compensation for 
mental harm.  In particular, their Honours criticised the lower courts’ approach, which treated 
section 30 as determinative of liability:    
To begin inquiries by asking whether s 30(2)(a) of the Civil Liability Act is engaged, without first deciding 
whether State Rail owed a duty to each appellant to take reasonable care not to cause him psychiatric 
injury, was to omit consideration of an important anterior question.30 
According to their Honours, the word “unless” in section 30(2) indicated that the subsection 
operated ‘as an exception to, or reservation from, what otherwise would be the entitlement of 
the plaintiff.’31  Therefore, in applying Part 3 of the Act ‘it would ordinarily be desirable to 
begin’32 by first determining whether a duty of care was owed under section 3233 before 
moving to consider the limitations imposed by section 30.34    
In relation to section 30(2)(a), and whether the claimants’ “witnessed, at the scene, the victim 
being killed, injured or put in peril,”  the Court held that although the section directed attention 
to an event (another being killed, injured or put in peril) happening while the plaintiff 
witnessed it, not ‘all cases of death, injury or being put in peril are events that begin and end 
in an instant.’35  Rather there are cases, such as the present, where ‘the consequences of the 
derailment took time to play out,’36 where death, injury, or being put in peril ‘takes place over 
an extended period.’37  Therefore, unlike the lower courts, the High Court did not consider 
fatal to their claim the claimants’ absence from the scene at the time of the accident.  Instead, 
the Court appears to support the view that the timeframe over which section 30(2)(a) 
operates includes not only the time during which an accident occurs but also the period over 
which the defendant’s negligence continues to operate so as to cause consequences to the 
                                                            
28 As required by Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 31.  See eg, Wicks v Railcorp; Sheehan v State Rail [2007] 
NSWSC 1346, [63]-[68], [83]; Sheehan v SRA; Wicks v SRA [2009] NSWCA 261, [2]-[4], [26], [78], [164]; Wicks, 
above n 12, [14]-[15], [20].    
29 Wicks, above n 12, [33]-[36].   
30 Ibid [15]. 
31 Ibid [13]. 
32 Ibid [32]. 
33 Section 32(1) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) provides that: ‘A person (the defendant) does not owe a 
duty of care to another person (the plaintiff) to take care not to cause the plaintiff mental harm unless the 
defendant ought to have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might, in the circumstances of the case, 
suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care were not taken.’  According to subsection 2, in a claim 
for pure mental harm, the circumstances of the case include: whether the mental harm was suffered as a result 
of a sudden shock; whether the plaintiff witnessed, at the scene, a person being killed, injured or put in peril; the 
nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and any person killed, injured or put in peril; and whether there 
was a pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. 
34 Wicks, above n 12, [22], [31]. 
35 Ibid [44].  See also [43]. 
36 Ibid [45]. 
37 Ibid [44]. 
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victim(s) in terms of them being killed, injured or put in peril:38 
[N]ot all the injuries sustained by those on the train were suffered during the process of derailment.  And 
the perils to which living passengers were subjected as a result of the negligence of State Rail did not 
end when the carriages came to rest.39 
Furthermore, in accidents involving mass causalities, section 30(2)(a) was considered to be 
‘satisfied where there was a witnessing at the scene of one or more persons being killed, 
injured or put in peril.’40  In such circumstances, given that the singular includes the plural in 
statutory interpretation,41 section 30’s reference to “victim” did not require claimants to 
establish a connection between their alleged psychiatric injury and what happened to a 
particular victim.  
On the facts, and in contrast to McColl JA in the Court of Appeal,42 their Honours noted that 
‘[t]he observation of fallen electrical cables draped over the carriages [was] but a dramatic 
illustration of one kind of peril to which those who remained alive in the carriages were 
subject before they were taken to a place of safety.’43  The Court considered that ‘[a] person 
is put in peril when put at risk’ and ‘remains in peril (is “being put in peril”) until the person 
ceases to be at risk.’44 Consequentially, and evidenced by the ‘agreed description’45 of the 
claimants as “rescuers,” because derailment survivors remained in peril until they had been 
taken to a place of safety, the claimants had witnessed, at the scene, victims “being put in 
peril” due to State Rail’s negligence.46   
The Court also seemed willing to infer that the claimants had witnessed victims “being 
injured” as a consequence of: 
 Trapped passengers receiving further injury during the rescue process; and 
 Survivors suffering psychological injuries as a result of the derailment and their 
experiences at the scene.47 
Consequently, as the claimants’ satisfied section 30(2)(a)’s requirements, the High Court 
remitted the matter to the Court of Appeal to determine the remaining issues identified 
above.48  
III. Conclusion   
The High Court’s decision in Wicks, therefore, has significant implications for rescuers and 
emergency workers who suffer pure mental harm in the course of their duties in New South 
                                                            
38 This is reflective of the claimants’ argument in the Court of Appeal which seemed to be generally accepted by 
McColl JA: Sheehan v SRA; Wicks v SRA [2009] NSWCA 261, [58]-[64] (Beazley JA), [89]-[91], [150] (McColl 
JA). 
39 Wicks, above n 12, [45]. 
40 Ibid [54].  See also [53].  Cf Wicks v Railcorp; Sheehan v State Rail [2007] NSWSC 1346, [82], [86]. 
41 Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 8(b). 
42 See also Sheehan v SRA; Wicks v SRA [2009] NSWCA 261, [65] (Beazley JA). 
43 Wicks, above n 12, [49]. 
44 Ibid [50]. 
45 Ibid [49]. 
46 Ibid [51]. 
47 Ibid [46]-[48]. 
48 Ibid [35], [52], [55].  See further above n 28 and accompanying text. 
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Wales and in other jurisdictions with similar legislation.49  It confirms that whilst section 30 of 
the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) qualifies the class of persons entitled to recover damages 
for pure mental harm once a duty of care is owed, in the case of non-relations that class is 
not restricted to those present at the time an accident occurs.50  Rather, the timeframe over 
which one may witness, at the scene, a victim being killed, injured or put in peril as required 
by section 30(2)(a) may include certain aspects of the accidents’ aftermath.  As such, the 
High Court clarifies the position of rescuers who, whilst performing an important social 
function, often attend the scene only after an event has occurred and being unrelated to the 
victim would consequentially be regularly denied liability under the lower courts’ approach.51   
Nevertheless, whether any particular case falls within section 30 remains a question of fact, 
and there will still be circumstances in which its limitations may apply to exclude a damages 
claim.  Indeed, in contrast perhaps to section 32(2)(a) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas),52 
section 30(2)(a)’s requirement of witnessing “at the scene” means that the duration of the 
aftermath falling within the section will be narrower than the common law position.  At 
common law, ‘the aftermath of an accident encompasses events at the scene after its 
occurrence, including the extraction and treatment of the injured,’ together with the period of 
immediate treatment away from the scene, for example, at hospital.53  However this later 
situation is clearly outside section 30(2)(a).  Additionally, whilst the period during which a 
victim is being killed, injured or imperilled may be longer in accidents causing mass disaster 
and requiring major rescue efforts, as in Wicks, some cases may still occur in an instant.54  
Therefore, a person who presents themself at a scene after someone has suffered a simple 
fall from a roof55 may not, in circumstances of no further risk, sufficiently witness the victim 
“being killed, injured or put in peril” as required by section 30(2)(a).  Consequently, whilst the 
interpretation provided by Wicks is a start, future litigation concerning section 30 is almost 
certain.   
 
 
                                                            
49 See eg, Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 73. 
50 Cf Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 53. 
51 Sheehan v SRA; Wicks v SRA [2009] NSWCA 261, [94]. 
52 Which extends to the ‘immediate aftermath of the victim being killed or injured:’ see above n 23 and 
accompanying text. 
53 Jaensch, above n 1, 607-8 (Deane J).  See also 612 (Dawson J). 
54 Wicks, above n 12, [44].  See also above n 35 and accompanying text. 
55 See eg, Ireland v Garry Denson Metal Roofing Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 999. 
